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PREFACE
The airline industry today is the leader in commercial inter­
city passenger transportation. In achieving this status the industry 
has evolved through definite eras, beginning about the time of the 
Great Depression. It is the purpose of this research to define these 
eras; and for each era to determine the needs of the industry, to 
categorize the management (as exemplified by the presidents of the 
industry) into business fields and to evaluate the success of manage­
ment in light of these needs.
The writer seeks to determine if there is a correlation 
existing between the needs of the industry, success, and type of 
management. Further, the writer seeks to evaluate the present and 
future situation in light of the historical findings, resulting in a 
forecast for airline management.
vii
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MANAGEMENT IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Chapter 1
THE NATURE OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Air transportation is the only truly Twentieth Century mode of 
domestic transport. Commercial air transportation began on December 4, 
1913, when Paul E. Fansler organized the St. Petersburg--Tampa Airboat 
Line. Scheduled domestic commercial airline service was inaugurated 
three and one-half weeks later as the airline flew its first passenger 
across Tampa Bay in Florida.
During the subsequent sixty-one years, the airline industry 
has evolved into a competitive network of highly sophisticated pri­
vate operating companies. Two forces have been primarily responsible 
for this fantastic growth--war and the government.
It was during World War I that the airplane was recognized as 
a viable instrument of warfare and was therefore developed by the 
government. Previously, all aircraft development had been by private 
industry with their rather limited resources. By the end of the war 
aircraft were becoming sophisticated and dependable, pilots were 
numerous and highly skilled, and the nation had suddenly become aware 
of the airplane as a means of transportation.
The government (Post Office Department) began to experiment 
with airmail service in 1918, with transcontinental airmail service 
established the following year. The government efforts to maintain a 
reliable domestic airmail service were at best only moderately
2
successful. As a result, Congress acted to create the United States 
airline industry by passing the Contract Air Mail Act (also known as 
the Kelly Act) in 1925. The act put the transportation of mail by 
air into private hands by means of competitive bidding for air mail 
routes. The following year Congress passed the Air Commerce Act. 
which provided for the establishment of airways and navigational aids 
the licensing of pilots and aircraft,, and the investigation of air­
plane accidents. While the Air Commerce Act gave the government more 
control of the newly emerging airline industry, it gave the industry 
much needed navigational aids and set standards to preserve the 
industry.
Since 1926 the air mail has been transported solely by privat 
airline companies, with the exception of a disastrous three-month 
period of government transportation in 1934. However, even though 
ownership and operation of the industry have been in private hands 
since 1926, the government has strictly controlled and regulated it.
Early airmail carriers were required by the government to 
provide facilities for transporting passengers along with the mail. 
The government hoped that passenger revenues to the airlines would 
reduce the necessary government subsidies paid to the companies for 
transporting the mail. It should be noted that the early airline 
companies were not only dependent upon the government for financial 
sustenance to operate, but they were dependent on the government 
for airways too. The federally maintained airways remain today 
although subsidies are no longer given to the trunklines.
4Throughout the 1930s travel by air remained primarily emer­
gency travel where speed was of the utmost importance. Air travel at 
this point in time was expensive and uncomfortable by the standards of 
today.
In the 1940s, World War II stimulated aircraft development and 
again increased awareness of the airplane as a means of transporta­
tion. Airline passenger volume increased immensely due to the demands 
of the war, resulting in prosperity and high earnings to the airline 
industry. This trend continued after the war because of several 
factors: The trunklines expanded their route mileage, frequent sched­
ules were offered, equipment became very reliable, and the competitive 
pressures between airline companies drove fares down.
Development of aircraft continued at a rapid pace even after 
the war due to the demand for increased passenger capacity as more 
people began to fly, the demand for increased speed and increased 
comfort, and the demand for increased flying ranges as routes were 
expanded and lengthened. By the 1950s the first turbojet aircraft 
had been put into service and air transportation for the first time 
was carrying more passengers than any other form of domestic trans­
portation. Also significant in the 1950s is the fact that airlines 
began carrying freight on a regular basis.
In the 1960s, the pure jets were put into widespread service 
bringing new dimensions in capacity, speed, comfort, and range in the 
airline industry. Already in the 1970s the jumbo jet generation has 
been developed to meet and exceed the growing demands for air
5transportation.
Table 1 shows the progress in aircraft development since the 
1930s. Table 2 sho\7s the growth of the airline industry since 1926.
Since World War II the aircraft manufacturing industry has 
seen tc it that the airline industry has had all the passenger cap­
acity it has needed--and more. As airline load factors have 
exceeded the break-even point (resulting in most cases in financial 
prosperity), the aircraft manufacturers have introduced a bigger 
and better and moie expensive type of aircraft. The competitive 
pressures forced all the companies in the industry to buy the newest 
and best aircraft. Purchase of the new aircraft required huge 
investments which necessitated heavy borrowing by the entire industry. 
After purchase load factors were always lowered as capacity of the 
new planes rose (and passenger growth remained near constant), 
resulting in poor, if any, profits. As load factors passed the break­
even point a newer and better aircraft would be introduced and the 
cycle would start all over again.
There is no doubt that the domestic economic situation has 
influenced the profits of the airline industry, but the effect seems 
to be minimal when compared with the effects of the aircraft manu­
facturing industry. Figure 1 (a graph) demonstrates the relationship 
between domestic airline industry net profits, the United States* 
economy, and the introduction of new aircraft.
Many believe the airlines are headed down a path similar to 
that of the railroads. They cite the constant overcapacity and the
6Table 1
Aircraft Development, 1930s through 1970s
Years Type of plane Capacity
(passenger 
seats)
Cruising
speed
(mph)
Normal
range
(miles)
1930s DC-3 30 200 2,000
1940s DC-4, C-46,
Constella­
tion 50 to 60 250 3,000
1950s Comet, Electra, 
DC-6, DC-7, 
Super Con­
stellation 80 to 95 325 4,000
1960s B-707, CV-880, 
DC-8 140 to 250 550 5,000
1970s B-747, DC-10, 
L-1011 350 to 500 600 6,000
Source:
Taylor, John W. R . , ed. Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, 
1941, 1954-1955, 1966-1967. New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1941,
1954-1955, 1966-1967.
7Table 2
Domestic Scheduled Airline Industry 
G r ow th— 1926 through 1970
Year Total revenue 
passenger 
miles traveled
(thousands)
Total revenue 
passengers 
enplaned
(thousands)
Total
passenger
revenue
(thousands 
of dollars)
Total 
investment
(thousands 
of dollars)
1926 1,272 6 NAa NA
1931 106,442 472 NA NA
1936 388,242 929 NA NA
1941 1,377,152 3,849 96,391 63,217
1946 5,903,111 12,164 314,517 262,535
1951 10,210,726 22,711 721,257 375,723
1956 21,643,140 41,937 1,367,367 765,243
1961 29,534,792 52,703 2,214,120 1,988,875
1966 56,802,788 97,746 4,070,635 3,411,305
1970b 104,155,983 153,408 7,066,115 5,000,000
^Not available, 
b
Total investment for 1970 is an estimate.
Source:
Civil Aeronautics Board. "Handbook of Airline Statistics," 
1971 Edition. Washington, D.C.: N.p., 1971. [ Booklet. ]
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Figure 1. Comparison of Gross National Product (GNP), Airline 
Industry Net Profits, and New Aircraft Introduction.
9high debt equity ratio occasioned by reequipment cycles as justifica­
tion. Stifling regulation is also cited as a contributing factor.
Ever since the passage of the Contract Air Mail Act and the 
Air Commerce Act., Congress has strictly regulated the airline indus­
try through the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). While the legislation 
was originally designed to be promotional, i.e., to encourage and 
preserve the new industry, subsequent legislation has been regulatory 
and almost to the point of being oppressive. Today the government 
regulates routes; aircraft design, operation, and maintenance; flight 
personnel; navigation and airways; fares; safety and accident 
investigation; ticket issuance; airports; and airline facilities.
Regulation is so complete that an airline operating an 
unprofitable route must continue to operate it with the same fare 
unless through the long and tedious process of administration review 
it can show that there is no "public convenience and necessity" being 
served in operating the route or that the fare is less than "just and 
reasonable." The burden of proof is on the airline making the air­
line point of view very difficult to establish beyond "a preponderance 
of the evidence."
Two federal administrative agencies deal exclusively with the 
airlines: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulates opera­
tions and routes and provides technical supervision to the airlines; 
and the Civil Aeronautics Board is charged with the economic regula­
tion and promotion of the airlines. It should be noted that the 
airlines are the only mode of transportation which Congress has
10
specifically legislated to promote. However, the legislation also 
provides that the airlines are to be competitive with other modes of 
transportation, taking into account the inherent advantages of each 
mode.
Chapter 2
DEFINITION OF ERAS IN AIRLINE 
INDUSTRY GROWTH
The United States' domestic airline industry has progressed 
through definite eras in its growth. These eras may be defined as 
the early years, the growth years, and the crisis years.
The early years are characterized by the dependency of the 
airline companies on mail contracts for existence, primitive aircraft, 
the high cost and discomfort of passenger air travel, the monopolis­
tic route structure, and a management by people with an operational 
background. The era commences with the beginning of commercial 
aviation in 1913 and extends up to the outbreak of World War II.
During this period passenger travel was light, although air 
mail service flourished. Aircraft were small, slow, uncomfortable, 
and could fly only short ranges. Many of the aircraft were designed 
to carry mail and passenger seats were an afterthought.
Although air mail routes were bid for on a competitive basis, 
there was only one route between any two cities. Hence, once the 
airline company got a route, it had a monopoly (no other company could 
carry mail over that route and it was financially impossible for an 
airline to exist carrying only passengers). Management of these young 
companies usually doubled as pilots and, in some cases, even as 
mechanics. This was the era of Eddie Rickenbacker (Eastern Air Lines),
11
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Juan Trippe (Pan American World Airways), and William Patterson (United 
Air Lines).
What is dubbed the growth era begins at the outbreak of World 
War II and runs up until the beginning of the jet age, roughly 1960. 
This era is characterized by huge passenger growth, greatly enlarged 
and improved aircraft, lower fares, and competition on routes.
World War II stimulated the development of aircraft and the 
airplane as a means of mass passenger transportation. The more 
highly developed and efficient aircraft permitted the lowering of 
fares. This factor, accompanied with a growing ax^areness of air 
travel, stimulated passenger traffic. Nex7 legislation created compe­
tition on the major air routes now that mail contracts were not the
bread and butter of the industry. Management became oriented toward
marketing as passenger traffic grew, aircraft capacity was enlarged, 
and competition between airlines over the same routes became keen.
The crisis era begins with the outset of the jet age and runs 
up to the present. The crisis refers to the financial situation of
the airline companies. During this period the debt to equity ratios
of the airlines began to skyrocket to the point where, at the present, 
they approach the debt to equity ratios of the railroads.
The crisis was brought about by the introduction of pure jet 
aircraft. The new jet aircraft required a huge initial investment, 
a large investment in spare parts, and an additional investment in 
ground equipment and facilities to accommodate the new type of air­
craft. This huge financial outlay came about at a time when the
13
United States economy was sluggish. Further, the new planes had a 
much larger passenger capacity than the old propeller planes, 
raising the number of passengers required on a flight to break even 
(although load factor break-even points were lowered).
About the time the airlines began to recover from the effects 
of breaking into the jet age, the jumbo jet age, or wide-body jet 
age, began with the introduction of the Boeing 747. This created the 
whole financial crisis all over again. This most recent financial 
crisis is being further complicated by the energy crisis and the cur­
rent recession. As this is being written, May, 1975, at least two 
major United States carriers are potential candidates for bankruptcy-- 
Pan American World Airways and Eastern Air Lines. The crisis era is 
characterized also by new horizons in aircraft speeds, comfort, and 
ranges.
Chapter 3
EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE OF SELECTED 
AIRLINE COMPANY PRESIDENTS
On the following pages the education and experience of thev 
past and present airline company presidents are analyzed. Those 
airlines whose presidents are considered include the major trunk 
carriers of the United States, i.e., American Airlines, Braniff 
Airways, Continental Airlines, Eastern Airlines, Delta Airlines 
National Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Pan American World Airways, 
Trans World Airlines, and United Airlines. In each case every 
president of the airline is examined from the incorporation of the 
company until the present.
An attempt is made to classify each president by the primary 
emphasis of his occupational experience prior to his becoming an 
airline president. A president's educational background is also 
considered where it is known, but to a lesser degree than his occu­
pational experience. The writer has concluded from his research that 
educational background, where known, has had little apparent influence 
on the career of airline presidents, but rather the primary influence 
has been one's occupational background.
The classification used on the succeeding pages is as follows:
1. Little or no business background. The president 
started his position with practically no business experience and in
14
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most cases started the airline company as his first business expe­
rience,
2. General business background. The president had no 
specific training or experience in any particular specialized area 
of business but had worked in various areas of business at the time 
he took over his position as president. The presidents of this cate­
gory have, in most cases, had broad managerial experience in undefined 
or multiple areas of business.
3. Financial background. The president has had his pre­
dominant experience in the financial aspects of business.
4. Marketing background. The president has had his pre­
dominant experience in the marketing and sales aspects of business.
5. Personnel background. The president has had his pre­
dominant experience in the field of personnel.
6. Military background. The president has had his pre­
dominant experience with the United States Armed Forces.
7. Operational background. The president has had his pre 
dominant experience in the operational aspects of business.
8. Legal background. The president has had his predomin­
ant experience in the practice of law, including private, corporate, 
and administrative practice.
9. Unknown background. The researcher was unable to 
obtain enough information as to the president's education and expe­
rience to make a judgment as to one of the other classifications.
AMERICAN AIRLINES
p r o logy of Presidents
Cyrus R. Smith 1934-1942
Ralph Damon 1945-1949
Cyrus R. Smith 1949-1964
Marion Sadler 1964-1968
George A, Spater 1968-1972
G. A. Warde 1972-1974
Albert V. Casey 1974-
17
Cyrus R. Smith
Education
BBA, University of Texas
Experience
Commercial pilot (although never flew professionally) 
Bank teller
Bookkeeper at cotton mill 
Public accountant
Junior officer, public utility company 
Treasurer, Texas Air Transport, Inc.
Vice President, Texas Air Transport, Inc.
Vice President, Southern Air Transport, Inc.
Vice President of Operations, American Airlines 
Deputy Commander, Air Transport Command, U.S. Air Force 
President, American Airlines
Classification: 2.
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Ralph S. Damon
Education
A B , Harvard
Experience
Factory superintendent, Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co. 
President, Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co.
Vice President and factory manager, Curtiss Robertson 
Airplane Mfg. Co.
Assistant to the executive Vice President, Curtiss
Wright Corp.
Vice President and general manager, Curtiss Wright
Airplane Co.
President, Curtiss Wright Airplane Co.
Vice President and factory manager, Keystone Aircraft
Corp.
Vice President--Operations, American Airlines 
President, Republic Aviation
Vice President and general manager, American Airlines 
President, American Airlines 
President, Trans World Airlines
Classification: 2.
19
Marion Sadler
Education
AB, Duke. University
MA, Duke University (English major)
Experience
Teacher
District sales manager, American Airlines 
Director of Passenger Sales, American Airlines 
Vice President--customer service, American Airlines 
Vice President and general manager, American Airlines 
President, American Airlines
Classification: 4.
AB, University of Michigan 
JD, University of Michigan
Experience
Lawyer; Cbadbourne, Park, Whiteside, & Wolff; New York
City
Executive Vice President and general counsel, American
Airlines
Vice Chairman, American Airlines 
President, American Airlines
Classification: 8.
21
G. A. Warde
Education
Attended University of Alabama 
Attended Hofstra College
Airways
Airlines
Experience
Foreman, American Export Airlines
Superintendent--line maintenance, Pan American World
Production manager--California, Eastern Airlines 
Apprentice mechanic, American Airlines 
General production manager, American Airlines 
Vice President--maintenance, American Airlines 
Vice President--maintenance and engineering, American
Senior Vice President--operations, American Airlines 
President, American Airlines
Classification: 2.
Albert V. Casey
Education
Railroad
AB, Harvard 
MBA, Harvard
Experience
Assistant Vice President— finance, Southern Pacific
Vice President— finance, Southern Pacific Railroad 
Assistant treasurer, Southern Pacific Railroad 
Vice President— finance, Railroad Express Agency 
Vice President--finance, Times Mirror Co. (newspaper
publisher)
Executive Vice President, Times Mirror Co. 
President, Times Mirror Co.
President, American Airlines
Classification: 3.
23
Chronology of Presidents 
Tom E. Braniff 
Charles E. Beard 
Harding L. Lawrence 
C. Edward Acker
BRANIFF AIRWAYS
1930-1954
1954-1964
1965-1970
1970-
Thomas E . Braniff
Education
Two years of high school
Experience
Insurance agent
Owner, Braniff Investment Co.
Owner, President and Chairman of the board, Prudential 
Fire Insurance Co.
President, Braniff Airways
Classification: 2
25
Charles E. Beard
Education
Attended Lake Forest College 
Attended University of Toledo
Experience
Newspaper reporter
Professional theatre actor on Broadway 
Owner, heavy hardware and implement business 
Secretary and manager, Chicago Air Traffic Association 
Passenger traffic manager, Northwest Orient Airlines 
General traffic manager, Braniff Airways 
Vice President— traffic and sales, Braniff Airways 
Executive Vice President, Braniff Airways 
President, Braniff Airways
Classification: 4
26
Harding L. Lawrence
Education
BBA, University of Texas 
LLB, South Texas College of Law
Experience
Assistant to the Vice Pre‘sident--Operations, Pioneer
Air Lines
General sales manager and Vice President--sales,
Pioneer Air Lines
Vice President— traffic and sales, Pioneer Air Lines 
Executive Vice President--traffic and sales, Continental
Airlines
Executive Vice President, Continental Airlines 
President, Braniff Airways
Classification: 4
27
C. Edward Acker
Education
BA, Southern Methodist University (major in economics 
and psychology)
Experience
Stock broker
Vice President, Lionel D. Edie & Co. (investment 
counsel and economic consultants)
Vice President--finance, Greatamerica Corp.
Senior Vice President--planning and administration, 
Braniff Airways
Executive Vice President and general manager, Braniff
Airways
President, Braniff Airways 
Classification: 2
28
CONTINENTAL AIRLINES
Chronology of Presidents
Robert F. Six 1938-
29
Robert F. Six
Education
High school
Experience
Pilot
Owner and operator, Valley Flying Service
District circulation manager, MSan Francisco Chronicle"
Coowner, Mouton and Six (aircraft distributors)
General manager, Varney Speed (air) Lines 
President, Continental Airlines
Cl assification: 7
30
DELTA AIR LINES
Chronology of Presidents
D. Y. Smith 1928-1934
C. E. Faulk 1934-1945
C. E. Woolman 1945-1965
#
C. H. Dolson 1965-1970
W. T. Beebe 1970-1971
David C. Garrett, Jr. 1971-
31
D. Y. Smith
Education
Experience
Classification: 9
32
C. E. Faulk
Education
Grammar school
Experience
Owner, Monroe News Star Publishing Co.
Owner and publisher; Longview, Texas, "News and Journal” 
President, Delta Air Lines
Classification: 2
33
C. E. Wool man
Education
BS, University of Illinois (major in agricultural
engineering)
Experience
County agricultural agent, Shreveport, Louisiana 
District agricultural agent, northern Louisiana 
Vice President and field manager, Huff, Dalund Dusters 
(crop dusting company)
Vice President and general manager, Huff, Dalund
Dusters
Vice President and general manager, Delta Air Lines 
President, Delta Air Lines
Classification: 2
34
G. K. Poison
Education
BS, Washington University (civil engineering major)
Experience
Test pilot, Curtiss-Wright Airplane Co.
Pilot, American Airlines*
Pilot, Delta Air Lines
Chief pilot, Delta Air Lines
Operations manager, Delta Air Lines
Vice President— operations, Delta Air Lines
Executive Vice President— operations, Delta Air Lines
President, Delta Air Lines
Classification: 7
35
William T. Beebe
Education
BBA, University of Minnesota
Experience
College trainee, General Electric Co.
Personnel manager, United Aircraft Corp.
Vice President--personnel and labor relations, Chicago 
and Southern Air Lines
Vice President--personnel, Delta Air Lines
Senior Vice President--administration, Delta Air Lines
President, Delta Air Lines
Classification: 5
36
David C, Garrett, Jr.
Education
BA, Furman University
MS, Georgia Institute of Technology
Experience
Worked in the marketing division of Delta Air Lines 
Director— methods and training department, Delta Air
Lines
Director-planning and coordination of jet introduction 
program, Delta Air Lines
Assistant of the executive Vice President— operations, 
Delta Air Lines
Assistant Vice President— operations, Delta Air Lines 
Vice President*— operations, Delta Air Lines 
Senior Vice President— operations, Delta Air Lines 
President, Delta Air Lines
Classification; 7
37
EASTERN AIR LINES
Chronology of Presidents
Edward V, Rickenbacker 1938-1953
Thomas F. Armstrong 1954-1958
Malcolm A. MacIntyre 1959-1963
Floyd D. Hall 1963-1967
Arthur D. Lev/is 1968-1970
Samuel L. Higginbottom 1970-1973
Floyd D. Hall 1973-
38
Edward V. Rickenbacker 
Education
Experience
Pilot
President, Rickenbacker Motor Co. (automobile 
manufacturing)
Vice President and director of sales, General Aviation 
Manufacturing Co.
Vice President, American Airways
Vice President, North American Aviation, Inc.
General manager, Eastern Air Lines 
President, Eastern Air Lines
Classification: 2
39
Thomas F. Armstrong 
Education
Experience
Secretary, Eastern Air Lines 
Treasurer, Eastern Air Lines 
President, Eastern Air Lines
Classification: 2
40
Malcolm A. MacIntyre
Education
BA, Yale 
BA, Oxford 
JD, Yale
Experience
Various legal jobs with law firms 
Corporate counsel, American Airlines 
Under-secretary of the U.S. Air Force 
Assistant secretary of defense 
President, Eastern Air Lines
Classification: 8
41
Floyd D. Hall
Education
BS, University of Colorado 
MBA, University of Michigan
Experience
Various management positions at Trans World Airlines 
General manager— U. S. operations, Trans World Airlines 
Vice President--flight operations, Trans World Airlines 
Vice President and general transportation manager,
Trans World Airlines
Senior Vice President and system general manager,
Trans World Airlines
President, Eastern Air Lines
Classification: 7
42
Arthur D. Lewis
Education
Student, University of Texas 
Student, Harvard
Experience
Manager of economic analysis, American Airlines 
Director of economic planning, American Airlines 
Assistant Vice President— planning, American Airlines 
Executive Vice President, Hawaiian Airlines 
President, Hawaiian Airlines
Senior Vice President and general manager, Eastern Air
Lines
President, Eastern Air Lines 
Classification: 2
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Samuel L. Higginbottom 
Education
BS, Columbia University (major in civil engineering) 
Advanced management training program, Harvard 
Business School
Experience
Design engineer
Various supervisory positions, Trans World Airlines 
Vice President--engineering, flight test, and 
inspection, Trans World Airlines
Vice President--operations group, Eastern Air Lines 
Senior Vice President— engineering and maintenance, 
Eastern Air Lines
President, Eastern Air Lines
Classification: 2
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NATIONAL AIRLINES
Chronology of Presidents
George T. Baker 1934-1962
L. B. Maytag, Jr. 1962-
Education
High school
Experience
Pilot
Owner of aircraft charter service 
President, National Airlines
Classification: 7
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L. B. Maytag, Jr.
Education
BBA, Colorado College
Experience
Founded Maytag Aircraft Corp. (flight school, private 
aircraft maintenance)
Licensed pilot with commercial rating 
President, Frontier Airlines 
President, National Airlines
Classification: 2
47
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES
Chronology of Presidents
Croil Hunter 1933-1954
Donald W. Nyrop 1954-
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Croil Hunter
Education
BA, Yale
Experience
Filot
Treasurer, Fargo Mercantile Go.
New York manager, First Bancredit Corp.
Traffic manager, Northwest Orient Airlines
Vice President and general manager, Northwest Orient
Airlines
President, Northwest Orient Airlines 
Classification: 2
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Donald
Board
Board
Board
W. N yrop
Education
AB, Doane College
LLB, George Washington University
Experience
Private law practice
Attorney general counsel's office, Civil Aeronautics
Executive officer to the chairman, Civil Aeronautics
Deputy administrator for operations, Civil Aeronautics
Administrator, Civil Aeronautics Board 
Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board 
President, Northwest Orient Airlines
Classification: 8
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PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS
Chronology of Presidents 
Juan T. Trippe 
Harold E. Gray 
Najeeb E. Halaby 
William T. Seawell
1927-1964
1964-1968
1968-1971
1971-
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Juan T. Trippe
Education
BA, Yale
Experience
President, Long Island Airways
Managing director, Colonial Air Transport
Pilot
President, Pan American World Airways 
Classification: 7
Education
BS, University of Detroit (major in mechanical
engineering)
Experience
Pilot, Ford Motor Co.
Pilot, Pan American World Airways
Chief pilot— Atlantic division, Pan American World
Airways
Operations manager, Pan American World Airways 
Division manager-Pacific and Alaska division, Pan 
American World Airways
Vice President--Pacific and Alaska division, Pan 
American World Airways
Executive Vice President— Atlantic division, Pan 
American World Airways
Executive Vice President-overseas division, Pan 
American World Airways
President, Pan American World Airways
Classification: 2
Najeeb E. Kalaby
Education
AB, Stanford 
LLB, Yale
Postgraduate work, University of Michigan Law School 
Experience
Lawyer, O'Melveny and Myers, Los Angeles 
Production test pilot, Lockheed Aircraft Corp. 
Foreign affairs advisor to the secretary of defense 
Deputy assistant secretary of defense 
Vice President, Servomechanisms, Inc.
Executive Vice President, Servomechanisms, Inc. 
President, American Technical Corp.
Vice President, Janass Corp.
Professor, University of California--Los Angeles 
Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration 
President, Pan American World Airways
Classification: 2
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William T. Seawell
Education
BS, U. S. Military Academy 
LLB, Harvard
Experience
Brigadier general, U. S. Air Force 
Deputy secretary of defense
Vice President— operations and engineering, Air Transport 
Association of America
Vice President— operation planning, American Airlines 
Vice President--flight, American Airlines 
Senior Vice President--operations, American Airlines 
President, Rolls Royce Aero Engines, Inc.
President, Pan American World Airways
Classification: 7
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TRANS WORLD AIRLINES
Chronology of Presidents
H. M. Hanshue 1930-1931
Richard W. Robbins 1931-1934
Jack Frye 1934-1947
LaMotte T. Cohu 1947-1948
Ralph S. Damon 1949-1956
Carter L. Burgess 1957-1957
Charles S. Thomas 1958-1960
Charles C. Tillinghast, Jr. 1961-1969
F. C. Wiser, Jr. 1969-
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Harris M. Hanshue
Education
Experience
Race car driver 
Car dealer
President, Western Air Express 
President, Trans World Airlines
Classification: 1
57
Richard W. Robbins
Education
Experience
Classification: 9
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Jack Frye
Education
High school
Experience
Pilot
Vice President, Aero Company of California 
President, Aero Company of California 
Vice President--operations, Western Air Express Corp. 
Vice President--operations, Transcontinental and 
Western Air, Inc.
President, Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc. 
President, Trans World Airlines
Classification: 7
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L aMotte T. Cohu
Education
AB, Princeton
Experience
Security salesman 
President, Air Investors, Inc.
President, Aviation Corp.
President, North American Aviation, Inc.
Chairman of the Board and general manager, Northrop 
Aircraft, Inc.
President, Trans World Airlines
Classification: 2
60
Ralph S. Damon
Education
A B , Harvard
Experience
Factory superintendent, Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co. 
President, Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Co.
Vice President and factory manager, Curtiss Robertson 
Airplane Mfg. Co.
Assistant to the executive Vice President, Curtiss
Wright Corp.
Vice President and general manager, Curtiss Wright
Airplane Co.
President, Curtiss Wright Airplane Co.
Vice President and factory manager, Keystone Aircraft
Corp.
Vice President--operations, American Airlines 
President, Republic Aviation
Vice President and general manager, American Airlines 
President, American Airlines 
President, Trans World Airlines
Classification: 2
Career L. Burgess
Education
BA, Virginia Military Institute
Experience.
Assistant to the President, Trans World Airlines 
Director of administration, General Aniline and Film
Corp.
Assistant to the President, University of South
Carolina
Assistant secretary, U. S. Department of Defense 
President, American Machine and Foundry Co, 
President, Trans World Airlines
Classification: 2
Charles S . Thomas
EducaLion
Attended University of California 
Attended Cornell University
Experience
Under secretary of the Navy
Assistant secretary of defense for supply and logistics 
Secretary of the Navy 
President, Trans World Airlines
Classification: 6
Charles
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C, Tillinghast, Jr.
Education
BA, Brown University 
LLB, Columbia Law School
Experience
Lawyer; Hughes, Schurman & Dwight; New York City 
Deputy assistant attorney general, New York County 
Vice President--international operations, Bendix Corp. 
President, Trans World Airlines
Classification: 8
64
F. C. Wiser, Jr.
Education
BS, U. S. Naval Academy 
MBA, Harvard
Experience
Assistant to executive Vice President, Container 
Corporation of America
Vice President, Pittsburgh Standard Conduit Co. 
Assistant to Vice President— operations planning, 
American Airlines
Vice President--operations, American Airlines
Vice President--technical services, American Airlines
President and chief executive officer, Northeast
Airlines
President, Trans World Airlines 
Classification: 2
UNITED AIR LINES
onology of Presidents
William A. Patterson 
George E. Keck 
Edward E. Carlson . 
Richard J. Ferris
1934-1963
1963-1971
1971-1974
1974-
66
William A. Patterson
Education
High school
Experience
Associated with Wells Fargo Bank, San Francisco 
Assistant to President, Boeing Air Transport 
Vice President, United Air Lines 
President, United Air Lines
Classification: 2
67
George E . Keck
Education
BS, University of Illinois
Experience
Acting plant manager, Owens— Illinois Can Co.
Work analyst— industrial engineering department,
United Air Lines
Director-industrial engineering department, United Air
Lines
Vice President-base maintenance, United Air Lines 
Executive Vice President— operations, United Air Lines 
Executive Vice President and general manager, United
Air Lines
♦
President, United Air Lines 
Classification: 2
68
Edward E. Carlson
Education
Attended University of Washington
Experience
Manager, President Hotel, Mt. Vernon, Washington
Manager, Rainier Club, Seattle
Vice President, Western Hotels, Inc.
Executive Vice President, Western Hotels, Inc. 
President, Western Hotels, Inc.
Chairman of the Board, Western Hotels, Inc. 
President, United Air Lines
Classification: 2
69
Richard J. Ferris 
Education
Experience
Associated with Western International hotels 
President, UAL, Inc. Food Services Division 
Group Vice President-marketing services, United
Air Lines
President, United Air Lines 
Classification: 2
Chapter 4
NEEDS OF TEE AIRLINE INDUSTRY BY ERA
During each of the eras defined previously; the airlines 
suffered a multitude of growing pains. The growing pains referred 
to are those of an industry-wide nature, occasioned by external 
forces. Those problems that were specific to only one or several 
carriers are not considered.
Competition in the airline industry has been keen ever since 
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, forcing an airline company to 
either fall by the wayside (go out of business or merge, in most
cases) or keep its position in the industry relative to the other
carriers. As a result, the air carriers in existence today have 
’‘grown up" together and faced similar problems along the way. The 
following pages will analyze these problems by era.
During the early years of the airline industry, aircraft
were crude, unreliable, and of a multitude of varieties; naviga­
tional equipment and airports were almost unknown; and pilots had 
little formal training in their occupation, if any. The major empha­
sis of the early years was in overcoming these problems and the major 
needs of this era were, therefore, of an operational nature.
Aircraft needed more standardization, more efficiency, and 
more dependability. An airline with two of the same type aircraft was 
indeed an exception. Parts were a constant problem as was maintenance
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of such a variety of aircraft.
Navigational equipment and airports were a inaicr stumbling 
block to the airlines due to the huge investment required. The air­
lines were struggling as it was to make a profit and lacked the 
additional capital to build airports or navigational systems along 
their routes.
Pilots needed to be a jack of all trades--mechanic, navi­
gator, and weather forecaster. In addition they needed the ability 
to fly a variety of different aircraft types and to be able to 
pick a good hard landing field. The pilots of this era were for 
the most part barnstormers turned professionals.
As a result of this situation, accidents were frequent and 
service unreliable. Further, the expense incurred by the ineffi­
ciencies of these early operations forced, many airlines out of 
business.
Until World War II, the airline industry had little organi­
zation-even the individual airline companies had little organization. 
However, with the tremendous growth in passenger demand occasioned 
by the war, organization became a necessity. Legislation was enacted 
during this period which furthered the organization and preservation 
of the industry. For the first time the government set standards 
for aircraft, maintenance, pilots, safety and service. Later, fares 
and the financial structure of the individual companies were also 
regulated.
By this time routes had become competitive and to compete
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successfully a company needed to become more efficient in its opera­
tions. The problems of organization became bigger as the companies
grew in size and newer, faster, and bigger aircraft were introduced.
The faster and larger airplanes required paved runways to 
land on and needed accurate methods of navigation to find the air­
ports. No longer could an airplane land in a cow pasture. Further,
the increase in passenger traffic required central collection points 
for the traveling public. It was the government who finally took 
over these problems in that the airline industry lacked the necessary 
capital and organization to overcome them.
The basic need, therefore, during the growth era was for 
organization by the industry to cope with the multitude of growing 
pains that were common to the industry and bigger than any of the 
individual airline companies.
As the airlines began to refurbish their fleets and comple­
mentary ground facilities during the early 1960s, it became necessary 
to raise huge quantities of capital. Wide swings in'earnings had made 
it difficult for most carriers to go to the equity market for the 
needed additional capital. At the same time, sources for long-term 
debt became more scarce as returns from operations dwindled. The 
orientation of the entire industry at this point was how to pay for 
all the new aircraft and equipment that was about to be delivered.
This situation was further complicated by an economic recession 
which decreased air travel and also revenues. And at the same time 
government regulation of the airline industry had grown to the point
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where it was stifling the alternatives available to the airline 
companies. In summary, the major need during the crisis era was for 
capital to finance the continued growth of the airline industry.
Chapter 5
SUCCESS OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY BY ERA
In considering the success of the airline industry one must 
take into account not only the operating results, but also the growth 
achieved. In Table 3 the operating results of the total domestic 
trunk airline industry of the United States are compared from 1926 to 
1974. In Table 4 the growth of the total domestic trunk airline 
industry of the United States is compared from 1938 to 1974.
To summarize these tables, in the early years profits were 
small as operations were inefficient, passenger travel was slight, 
and the companies had to exist from their government mail subsidies. 
As passenger traffic began to slowly increase and new mail routes 
were awarded, there was some significant growth.
In the "growth era" growth was the major factor. The indi­
vidual airline companies were competitive for the first time during 
this period and their competitive efforts stimulated passenger travel 
immensely. Profits fluctuated widely depending upon new aircraft 
introductions and the domestic economic climate. The operating 
results of the airline industry have always reflected the economic 
situation of the country, i.e., when the economy was booming, profits 
were soaring and when the country experienced a recession, profits 
were significantly decreased. As mentioned earlier, the introduction 
of a new type of airplane always reflected adversely on the income
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Year
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
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Table 3
Operating Results— Total United States’ 
Domestic Trunk Airlines
Operating Total Rate of
profit investment return on
total
investment
(hundred (hundred
thousands of thousands of
dollars) ' dollars) (%)
( l.l)a 30.2
4.6 35.8
5.9 54.5
7.3 61.9
26.0 76.7
27.0 96.1
36.1 126.9
33.5 168.1
( 5.2) 257.0
( 20.9) 299.4 ( 4.65)
2.1 319.1 2.65
24.6 321.2 5.91
62.6 335.7 12.09
105.9 353.2 13.44
95.1 417.4 14.19
88.4 486.2 11.22
99.5 522.5 11.21
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Table 3 (continued)
Year Operating
profit
(hundred 
thousands of 
dollars)
Total
investment
(hundred 
thousnads of 
dollars)
Rate of 
return on 
total 
inves tment
(%)
1955 122.6 589.9 11.85
1956 100.6 711.2 9.57
1957 42.1 903.7 4.80
1958 95.1 1,066.9 6.49
1959 105.2 1,320.7 7.12
1960 34.9 1,579.6 2.79
1961 11.1 1,829.3 1.00
1962 74.9 1,963.7 3.72
1963 129.2 1,919.3 4.02
1964 296.8 2,033.8 9.62
1965 416.2 2,369.3 12.04
1966 453.7 3,044.7 10.36
1967 410.1 6.90
1968 320.1 4.90
1969 304.4 4.30
1970 14.8 1.40
1971b 229.5 3.30
1972b 434.1 5.10
1973b 413.9 4.70
Table 3 (continued)
77
Year Operating Total Rate of
profit investment return on
(hundred 
thousands of
(hundred 
thousands of
total
investment
dollars) dollars) (%)
1974k 679.4 7.80
Parentheses indicate deficit.
^Includes statistics for Alaska and Hawaii.
Sources;
Civil Aeronautics Board. "Handbook of Airline Statistics," 
1971 Edition. Washington, D.C.: N.p., 1971. [ Booklet. ]
Air Transport Association of America. "Air Transport 1974." 
Washington, D.C.: N.p., 1974. [ Booklet. ]
Year
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
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Table 4
Growth— -Total United States' 
Domestic Trunk Airlines
Available
seat
miles
(hundred
thousands)
Annual 
rate of 
growth
m
Revenue
passenger
miles
(hundred
thousands)
Annual Total Annual 
rate of passenger rate
growth revenues of
(hundred gr0Wth 
thousands 
of
(%) dollars) (%)
1.3
1.9 49.8
10.5 452.5
35.1 233.9
84.0 139.1
106.4 26.7
300.0 127.0 19.4
370.1 23.4 173.5 36.6
362.5 ( 2.1)a 187.9 8.3
572.5 57.9 279.4 48.7
680.7 18.9 388.2 39.0
828.2 21.7 407.3 4.9
944.7 14.1 475.6 16.8 24.3
1,209.6 28.0 679.8 42.9 34.5 42.0
1,809.4 49.6 1,047.1 54.0 52.7 52.8
2,330.6 28.8 1,377.2 31.5 69.0 30.9
Year
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
Table 4 (continued)
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Available Annual Revenue 
seat
miles
(hundred
thousands)
Annual Total Annual
rate of passenger rate of passenger rate
growth miles growth revenues of
growth
(%)
(hundred
thousands) (%)
(hundred
thousands
of
dollars) (%)
1,949.7 (16.3) 1,405.8 2.1 73.7 6.8
1,838.5 ( 5.7) 1,617.1 15.0 86.0 16.7
2,418.1 31.5 2,161.0 33.6 115.0 33.7
3,784.5 56.5 3,336.3 54.4 164.4 43.0
7,490.4 97.9 5,903.1 76.9 272.6 65.8
9,152.4 22.2 6,016.3 1.9 303.2 11.2
9,980.2 9.0 5,840.2 ( 2.9) 334.7 10.4
11,117.7 11.4 6,570.7 12.5 378.1 13.0
12,385.6 11.4 7,760.0 18.2 430.1 13.8
14,672.0 18.5 10,210.7 31.5 570.3 32.6
18,068.1 23.1 12,120.8 18.7 671.3 17.7
22,114.8 22.4 14,297.6 18.0 775.8 15.6
25,623.3 15.9 16,234.6 13.5 872.1 12.4
29,978.6 17.0 19,205.7 18.3 1 ,021.1 17.1
33,752.6 12.6 21,643.1 12.7 1,142.2 11.9
39,838.2 18.0 24,499.5 13.2 1,287.2 12.7
40,695.0 2.2 24,435.7 ( 0.3) 1,363.0 5.9
45,793.2 12.5 28,127.2 15.1 1,632.6 19.8
Year
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971b
197 2b
1973b
1974b
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Table 4 (continued)
Available Annual Revenue
seat rate of passenger
miles growth miles
(hundred
thousands) (%)
(hundred
thousands)
Annual Total Annual 
rate of passenger rate
growth revenues of
(hundred growth
thousands
of
(%) dollars) (%)
49,153.3 7.3 29,233.2 3.9 1,756.4 7.9
52,525.0 6.9 29,534.8 1.0 1,826.8 4.0
59,736.8 13.7 31,827.8 7.8 2 ,021.0 10.6
67,601.3 13.2 36,383.8 14.3 2,208.4 9.3
75,242.4 11.3 41,658.4 14.5 2,504.9 13.4
88,731.2 17.9 48,987.0 17.6 2,908.0 16.1
97,174.7 9.5 56,802.8 16.0 3,233.1 11.2
124,141.6 27.8 70,990.1 25.0 3,901.5 20.7
153,864.6 23.9 81,611.8 15.0 4,451.3 14.1
178,646.7 16.1 89,184.6 9.3 5,087.5 14.3
182,780.3 2.3 89,410.3 0.3 5,263.6 3.5
202,509.5 10.8 97,756.1 9.3 6,750.4 28.2
206,617.9 2.0 108,190.0 10.7 7,510.5 11.3
222,446.6 7.7 115,352.2 6.6 8,382.4 11.6
210,997.1 ( 3.1) 117,616.3 2.0 8,510.2 1.5
Q
Parentheses indicate a deficit. 
bIncludes statistics for Alaska and Hawaii.
Table 4 (continued)
Sources:
Civil Aeronautics Board. "Handbook o 
1971 Edition. Washington, D.C.: N.p., 1971.
Air Transport Association of America. 
Washington, D.C.: N.p., 1974. [ Booklet. ]
Airline Statistics, 
[ Booklet. ]
"Air Transport 1974
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statement because of the costs involved not only in the initial pur­
chase of the airplane, but. also the costs associated with the 
complementary equipment and in introducing the aircraft into service.
In the crisis era growth began to slow and fluct’iate. 
Economists have recently begun to talk of the airlines as a maturing 
industry because of the dramatic decrease in their rate of growth. 
Operating profits during this era again fluctuated widely for the 
same reasons as in the previous period.
Chapter 6
CORRELATION OF EDUCATION-EXPERIENCE,
NEEDS, AND SUCCESS
On the previous pages the education and experience of various 
presidents of the airlines, the needs of the airline industry by era, 
and the success of the industry during the past fifty years have been 
analyzed. In relating these three factors one should note that it is 
assumed that a president's influence in the operation of his company 
was predominant and, therefore, his education and experience were 
largely responsible for the orientation of the airline company. This 
is a realistic assumption in that the president of an airline is 
usually also the chief operating officer and makes the necessary 
day-to-day decisions affecting the company. Many of the presidents 
of the airlines were autocrats and literally made all the decisions 
affecting their companies. This was especially true of the early 
presidents.
In this light the following will be considered: Did manage­
ment have the education and experience to meet the needs of the 
airline industry in each era? To what degree was the success of the 
industry dependent upon the occupational qualifications of management 
as reflected in the industry's presidents? What correlation exists, 
if any, between the needs of the industry, the success of the indus­
try, and the education and experience of the presidents of the
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industry?
While most of the early dominant presidents in the airline 
industry have backgrounds which fit into the category of general busi­
ness experience, at least seven out of the ten have had flying expe­
rience. These, include C. R. Smith of American Airlines, Robert F. Six 
of Continental Airlines, Eddie Rickenbacker of Eastern Airlines,
George T. Baker of National Airlines; Croil Hunter of Northwest 
Airlines, Juan Trippe of Pan American Airways, and Jack Frye of 
Trans World Airlines. Some of these presidents have flown profes­
sionally and extensively while others have flown only as barnstormers 
before beginning their career with the airlines; four of these 
pioneers have primarily operational backgrounds: Robert F. Six,
George T. Baker, Juan Trippe, and Jack Frye.
As mentioned earlier, the needs of this early era were 
operational in nature. It was a constant challenge just to keep the 
airplanes operating, much less on a regular schedule. Little effort 
was given during this period to stimulating passenger traffic or 
financial matters. There was, however, much attention given to new 
mail contracts as this provided additional income.
The success during the early years of commercial aviation was 
in the mere existence of the airlines and the industry. Some carriers 
were fortunate enough to win new routes which allowed for expansion 
of their operations, however until 1938 the industry grew very little.
It is evident that there appears to be a very strong correla­
tion during the early years of the airline industry between
management's experience, as exemplified by the presidents of the 
companies, and the needs of the industry. The majority of the presi­
dents considered had some flying experience and almost half had 
operational backgrounds. The primary need of the era was of an 
operational nature, which management wan well qualified to handle.
The industry was very successful during this era too, recognizing 
its existence through a period of adversity. The success can be 
largely attributed to the ability of management to meet the needs 
of the industry, so there is a strong correlation here also.
As in the early era, a majority of the "growth era" presi­
dents of the airlines fit into the. broad general business background 
category. Of the remainder a wide diversity of backgrounds are 
represented: military, operational, legal, and marketing. However,
examining the background of these presidents more carefully, there 
appear to be several with experience in the marketing area of busi­
ness. Thomas Braniff of Braniff Airways was an insurance salesman, 
Robert F. Six of Continental Airlines was the circulation manager for 
a newspaper, Eddie Rickenbacker of Eastern Airlines was a director 
of sales for an aircraft manufacturer, LaMotte T. Cohu of Trans World 
Airlines was a security salesman, and Charles E. Beard of Braniff 
Airways (Thomas Braniff1s successor) had a background predominantly 
in the marketing area.
The needs of the growth years were primarily those of an 
organizational nature. The fantastic growth in air transportation 
which occurred after the war and the competition between carriers for
the first time required organ!zation for the preservation of the 
industry and continued orderly growth.
The success of this era, as mentioned above, was mixed. If 
growth is the cole measure of success then the airline industry was 
tremendously successful. However, if operating profits are considered 
this position must be moderated. During this period the airlines 
faced several crises which were reflected on the income statement-- 
three economic recessions and the first major reequipment cycle of 
the industry. Considering both growth and operating profit, the 
industry fared well but by no means achieved the heights industry 
proponents and investors of the era predicted.
Taking all of the above into account, there appears to be 
some correlation between the management, needs and success of the 
industry during the growth era, but not nearly as defined as in the 
early years. Management was diversified in their backgrounds, although 
there was a definite emphasis in the sales and marketing area. The 
major need of the era was organization to deal with the explosive 
growth of the industry and the competition between carriers. Those 
presidents with some experience in the sales and marketing area were 
certainly better equipped to deal with the growth and competition of 
the era than those with no such experience. As for organizational 
skills, the background information available is inconclusive. Broad 
business experience is probably most helpful in teaching organiza­
tional skills, rather than experience in any one particular area of 
business. As was pointed out, the majority of the presidents of this
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era had broad business exposure.
Success during this era was mixed and depended much on exter­
nal factors and management’s ability to deal with them. There appears, 
therefore, to be some correlation between the success of the industry 
and management's ability to meet the needs of the industry.
Approximately half of the presidents during the crisis era 
had a broad business background while the remainder had a wide variety 
of backgrounds. There does not appear to be any pattern among manage­
ment's experience during this era as in the previous era. Particularly 
noteworthy 'is the fact that no president had either a strictly finan­
cial background or even a strong experience in finance.
The needs of the crisis era, however, are mainly in the finan­
cial area of business as huge quantities of capital were necessary to 
refurbish fleets and facilities for the jet age. It appears, there­
fore, that a negative correlation exists between management1s back­
ground and the needs of this era.
The negative correlation is reflected in the success of the 
industry. The operating profits during the crisis years fluctuated 
even more widely than during the growth era. The industry went from 
one extreme to the other during this era--record profits were set and 
extremely adverse results were achieved. Undoubtedly, the fact that 
management lacked the necessary background to meet the predominant 
needs of the industry during this era contributed largely to the 
irregular profit pattern of the industry. Certainly the economic 
climate played a major role in the operating results too, as in the
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previous era. Growth during this era was irregular and fluctuated 
in rate, although there was no negative growth.
Chapter 7
CURRENT PROBLEMS OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The current situation in the airline industry is not favor­
able. Both business and pleasure air travel have declined recently 
as real personal disposable income decreased, air fares rose, 
unemployment rose, and the chief economic indicators further 
deteriorated. The industry earned 247 million dollars during 1974,
48 percent ahead of 1973, because of a number of factors: Good
domestic traffic most of the year resulting from the gasoline 
shortage scare, multiple fare increases, and a contraction in 
capacity necessitated by the allocation of fuel.'*'
During the first quarter of 1975 the airline industry per­
formed poorly and this trend is predicted by many to continue through­
out most of the year because of the sluggish economy. However, anti­
recession measures now being effected by the government should bring 
about a more favorable climate for the airline industry after mid­
year that could be reflected in domestic traffic before fourth 
quarter.
With real disposable personal income, considered by many to be 
the most powerful influence on pleasure travel, likely to enter an
^Standard and Poor, "Industry Surveys--Air Transport,"
April 17, 1975, p. 63. [ Pamphlet. ]
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uptrend early in the second half of 1975, and the sharp drop in corpo­
rate profits likely to ameliorate, there should be some positive
forces at work that could considerably strengthen prospects as the
2
industry moves into 1976.
New discount fares are hoped to generate a considerable amount 
of new traffic yet this year. Further, another domestic fare increase 
may be fully justified, under Civil Aeronautics Board standards for 
considering increases, by mid-1975.
Fuel, which nearly doubled in prices during 1974, will 
undoubtedly continue to climb in price, however, at a much smaller rate 
than during 1974. This is assuming that sharp increases in traffic 
and taxes can be avoided and another mid-East confrontation can be 
averted. It is important to note that fuel is still being allocated 
to the airlines and will probably continue to be a scarcity for the 
indefinite future. This may result in long-term growth being con­
strained.
Growth in terms of capacity during the near future will con­
tinue as the industry continues to take delivery of additional 
wide-body jet aircraft ordered several years ago. As new aircraft 
deliveries taper off capital outlays will decline. Commitments for 
new equipment during 1975 are forecast at the one billion dollar
level, down from the 1.4 billion dollars spent during 1974. Capital
3
expenditures should further decline during 1976.
2
Ibid., p. 64. 
^Ibid., p . 65.
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As pointed but previously, the success of the airline industry 
closely parallels the domestic economy and the present time period is 
no exception. The. economy is expected to improve in the second half 
of 1975 and further improve during 1976. It is very likely that 
airline industry profits and growth will follow this trend.
Chapter 8
CURRENT NEEDS OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY
The key to healthy profits in the airline business is a high 
load factor combined with a low break-even point. The cost structure 
of the airlines is such that fixed costs are high and many of the 
variable costs are noncontrollable. The airlines have huge capital 
investments and no control over such costs as fuel and the effects 
of inflation. Therefore, the major emphasis of the industry should 
be not on decreasing the break-even point, but rather on raising load 
factors to compensate for the increased costs of operations.
There are two approaches for an airline company to raise load 
factors in a competitive market. First, an airline can attempt to 
’’steal" passengers from competition by aggressive marketing programs 
or offering special bargains; second, an airline company can attempt 
to stimulate total industry demand for air travel and be content with 
its fair share of the new business stimulated. Unfortunately, most 
carriers today have opted for the first alternative.
Some airlines have been very successful in their efforts to 
"steal" passengers from competition to the competitor's detriment.
The classic modern example is National Airlines with the "Fly Me" 
campaign. On the New York City to Miami route, over which National 
competes with Eastern Airlines and Delta Air Lines, National suc­
ceeded in taking away 40 percent of Eastern's business and 20 percent
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of Dalta's .business. National's profits soared to new records last 
year, largely because of its success against competition, while 
Eastern's profits dipped to new lows. Eastern had many problems last 
year, but National's success played a major role in its gigantic 
loss.
It is evident that by increasing industry demand the whole 
industry benefits. Traffic on all carriers increases and helps all 
carriers to combat the increase in costs.
Another technique the industry has to combat the rise in 
costs is to increase prices of air travel, as was done on three occa­
sions during 1974. However, there is a strong indication that demand 
for air travel is very elastic and that as prices go up, demand goes 
down. It then becomes a question of at what fare level are revenues 
maximized. After reaching the point of maximization, increasing fares 
will decrease total revenues because less people will fly.
The airline industry has very few operational problems at 
this point in time due to recent technological advances, the state of 
the art, and no recent new aircraft introductions. With the decline 
for new equipment, the requirements for external financing will drop 
substantially in the next few years. Under favorable conditions, 
however, some equity financing may be undertaken to improve the 
unfavorable debt/equity ratios of the industry.
In summary, the primary need of the airline industry today, 
and the need for the remainder of this decade, will be to increase 
load factors at a pace equal to or exceeding the increase in the
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break-even point. This appears to be the most effective, weapon the 
industry has against the increases in operating costs, which are 
presently causing and will continue to cause profits to deteriorate.
Chapter 9
EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE OF SELECTED 
CURRENT AIRLINE COMPANY PRESIDENTS
Since the basic need of the airline industry at the present 
and in the future is for an increased growth rate in passenger 
travel, one would expect the majority of the current airline presi­
dents to have marketing backgrounds in order to achieve the needed 
increase in demand. However, such is not the case.
Out of the ten airlines considered, four have presidents 
with operational backgrounds: Robert F. Six of Continental Airlines;
David C. Garrett, Jr., of Delta Air Lines; Floyd D. Hall of Eastern 
Airlines; and William T. Seawellof Pan American World Airways.
Further, L. B. Maytag of National Airlines and F. C. Wiser, Jr., 
of Trans World Airlines have some operational experience. Mr. Maytag 
is currently licensed to pilot all of the various types of aircraft 
his company operates.
Albert V. Casey of American Airlines is the only airline 
president to currently have a financial background, although C. Edward 
Acker of Braniff Airways has considerable financial experience. It 
would almost be expected that there would be more finance-experienced 
chief executives at this point in time since financial needs were 
the primary need of the industry during the past fifteen years.
Only United Airline's new president, Richard J. Ferris, has
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had any substantial marketing background. Previous to his new posi­
tion, he was ground vice president of marketing services at United, 
However, the rest of his background is so varied that he is classi­
fied as having a general business background,
David C. Garrett, Jr.. worked in the marketing division of 
Delta as the first job of his career, but because of the limited 
responsibility and the length of time ago his marketing experience 
is considered minimal.
Donald W. Nyrop of Northwest Airlines was formerly a chair­
man of the Civil Aeronautics Board and as such has had considerable 
experience in dealing with passenger growth, however, he has no 
direct marketing experience. As pointed out previously, Robert F.
Six was a circulation manager for a newspaper company many many 
years ago.
Chapter 10
CORRELATION OF CURRENT NEEDS, PROBLEMS,
AND PRESIDENTS’ EDUCATION-EXPERIENCE
Again, as in the crisis era, there appears to be little 
correlation between the needs of the airline industry and the back­
grounds of the airline company presidents. A marketing background 
would seem necessary to best develop industry sales, however, only 
one president has any substantial marketing background.
As for the success of the industry, it seems to be follow­
ing the pattern set by the economy. When the economy is booming, 
so are airline profits and when the economic situation is deteri­
orating, as at present, airline profits are down. However, it appears 
that management’s skills and experience do play a major factor in the 
success of the airline, especially in those periods of economic 
adversity.
At the present time, a period of economic adversity, five of
lK >  4  ■* f
the ten airlines studied made a profit first quarter while five lost 
money. They all faced the same economic situation so management 
must be one of the factors that made half of them successful and half 
of them unsuccessful. A carrier’s route structure is another factor. 
Those airlines with’major routes to tourist centers suffer adverse 
economic consequences more than those carriers with routes primarily 
between trade centers.
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There appears to be no correlation between the success of the 
industry and management's ability to meet the needs of the industry. 
Operating results are mixed while in practically no case does manage­
ment's background meet the needs of the industry. For example, 
National Airlines produced a 6.4 million dollar profit in the first
quarter and its president, L. B. Maytag, has a general business
4
background with a majority of his experience in operations.
4
"First Quarter Profit Survey," Business Week, May 19, 1975,
p. 70.
Chapter 11 
VALIDITY OF RESEARCH
As pointed out at the beginning of this research, it has been 
assumed that the president of an airline sets the direction his com­
pany takes and is the overwhelming influence on policy and major deci­
sions. An assumption of this nature, was necessary to make the 
correlation analysis of this research. If the data of all the top 
management of the ten airlines studied were included, it would have 
grown to such proportions that any meaningful analysis would have been 
impossible. However, this does not make the assumption correct.
As is true .in all human nature, there are those individuals 
who are strong leaders and autocrats. On the other hand, there are 
also those individuals who are weaker and content to take a back 
seat. Unfortunately, it is impossible to differentiate between the 
two types of presidents in most cases because of a lack of informa­
tion. This analysis would be much more meaningful if it could be 
determined which presidents influence were truly reflected in the 
direction the companies went and which presidents only played a pas­
sive role in setting the direction their companies took.
It appears from the foregoing research that the economy plays 
a major role in the success of an airline company and the entire 
industry as a whole, and management, therefore, has only a limited 
amount of control over success. When the economy is booming it is
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hard for an airline company not to make a profit, however, when there 
is a period of economic adversity the skills of management become 
manifest. It has largely been assumed throughout the foregoing 
analysis that the success of an airline is entirely dependent upon 
management's direction of the company (as exemplified by the presi­
dent of the company) .
Further, the effect of government regulation on the success 
of the airline industry has been considered only briefly because of 
the very subjective nature of the effect. It is evident today, how­
ever, that the massive regulation the industry must comply with cuts 
deeply into operating profits. For example, an airline is not per­
mitted to terminate an unprofitable route without the consent of the 
Civil Aeronautics Board, which is very difficult and time consuming 
to obtain.
Because of these three factors, i.e., the assumption that a 
president is the major influence in the direction his company takes, 
that the economy plays only a minor role in the success of an air­
line, and the omission of the effects of regulation, the validity 
of this research is questionable. However, the area of concentra­
tion is so subjective that these assumptions were necessary to make 
any useful analysis.
The research definitely shows some trends in management, 
exemplified by the presidents in the industry, the needs of the indus­
try, and management's qualifications to meet these needs. The 
research also points up the success of the industry; however, it fails
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to show how much of the success or failures of the Industry is 
attributable to management's ability to meet the needs of the indus­
try. If the effects of the economy and government regulation could 
have been eliminated, then the determination of how management's 
ability to meet the needs of the industry and how it effects the 
success of the industry could have been made with a significant 
degree of validity.
Chapter 12
COMPARISON OF CURRENT-HISTORICAL SITUATION;
FORECAST FOR MANAGEMENT; CONCLUSION
Looking to the future, growth will be a major factor. The 
reequipment cycle begun with the introduction of wide-body aircraft 
has almost been completed and the only problem facing the airlines 
in the immediate future is how to fill up all those empty seats.
In that increasing passenger loads is the major need of the immediate 
future, a marketing-oriented management appears the most desirable.
The airline industry is beginning to face a period of time 
similar to the growth period which occurred after World War II.
To survive and prosper traffic must increase now that capacity has 
increased, and expenses along with it. After the War when the 
first major reequipment cycle of the industry occurred, management 
was faced with the problem of how to fill up the new and larger air­
craft with passengers, in order to pay for the aircraft. This is 
precisely the situation at the present time; the industry has a lot 
of new expensive larger aircraft that are not paid for yet; and 
unless traffic increases, they will not be able to pay for them.
Of course, many aircraft today are leased, but leasing costs 
are high. An airline that cannot keep a leased aircraft full of pas­
sengers cannot prosper either.
Looking toward the 1980s, there is a likelihood that another
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reequipment cycle will occur out of necessity to preserve the aircraft 
manufacturing industry. New aircraft have always been more elaborate 
and more expensive than their predecessors. Therefore, the airlines 
will once again have a financing problem, similar to the. crisis era 
of the 1960s. At this point, a finance-oriented management will 
become desirable as new means will be required to finance the new 
purchases.
It appears that the airline industry is headed for a contin­
uous series of crisis eras and growth eras, which will be triggered 
by impending new-type aircraft introductions. The impending intro­
duction will trigger the crisis era and the growth era will follow 
as the airlines slowly recover from the financial crisis and begin to 
stimulate new passenger growth. The situation probably will not be 
as clear-cut as it would seem because the state of the economy will 
undoubtedly complicate things. However, the cycle will be very 
distinct.
Management in the future will, therefore, need to follow the 
particular needs of the era--financial background for the crisis 
eras and marketing backgrounds for the growth eras.
It appears that this cycle of crisis and growth may have been 
continuing in the airline industry since World War II but for a number 
of reasons it has not been made manifest.
After World War II there was plenty of capital available to 
the airlines so a crisis era did not really occur when the reequipment 
cycle began. However, the growth era did manifest itself. The next
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new aircraft introduction, the. beginning of the jet age, did trigger 
a crisis era because capital was not readily available.
A growth period did occur during the late 1960s as is evident 
in Table 4, however, it was short-lived. At the beginning of the 1970s 
another new aircraft introduction, the wide-body jets, precipitated 
another crisis era. Had the economy been booming during the late 
1960s the growth period would have been more pronounced.
At the present time the airlines are. recovering from the 
wide-body jet introductions and will undoubtedly seek to stimulate 
passenger traffic in the near future, beginning a growth period. The 
growth period may have already begun in that new discount, fares and 
advertising campaigns have occurred already during 1975. However, 
the effects of the efforts of the industry are being obscured by the 
adverse, economic climate.
The industry may already have begun to react to this growth 
period in that its newest president, Richard J. Ferris of United 
Airlines, has a strong marketing background. Perhaps this is the 
direction that management will take during the remainder of the 
1970s and on into the 1980s until another major reequipment cycle 
occurs.
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